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COMMENTS ON GEDICKS AND BALL
MARK TUSHNET*

In April 1989 the newspapers revealed an incident involvingJustice O'Connor that sheds light on the arguments offered
by Professors Gedicks and Ball. In response to a request from
a political acquaintance in Arizona, Justice O'Connor sent a letter listing three Supreme Court cases that, she said, "held" that
"this is a Christian nation."' One of them, from 1892, did say
that;' another says nothing of the sort.3 It is the third that
interests me. The citation Justice O'Connor provided was to
Zorach v. Clauson, which I remembered for the celebrated statement by Justice Douglas that "[w]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. '
Justice O'Connor's letter is revealing, particularly in light
of her opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,5 where she came close to
saying that no reasonable Jew could fairly regard a municipal
creche as a statement that Jews were outsiders to the political
community. 6 Consider this version of what happened: Justice
O'Connor is of course familiar with Zorach, and she
remembered its statement about religion. When she remembers a statement that "we are a religious people," it is retrieved
by her memory as "we are a Christian people," because, after
all, the equation in her mind between religion and Christianity
is entirely natural; indeed, I suggest that Lynch shows that she
has to think very hard to imagine that religion encompasses
more than Christianity, as when she
is hit over the head with
7
the point in Goldman v. Weinberger.
*

Georgetown University Law Center.

1.

See Dershowitz,Justice O'Connor's Second Indiscretion, N.Y. Times, Apr.

2, 1989, at § 4, 31, col. 2.
2.

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471

(1892).
3.
4.
5.

But see id. at 470 ("this is a religious nation") (emphasis added).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (creche "cannot fairly be understood" to

convey message of governmental endorsement of Christianity) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
6.

It might be unwise to make too much of the letter, for Justice

O'Connor may have relied on sloppy research by someone; one news story
hinted that she copied a letter that ChiefJustice Burger had written.
7. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 528-33 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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I recount this incident not to score points on Justice
O'Connor, but rather to identify a more general problem that
affects discussions of religion and public policy, the topic of our
principal papers. The problem is this: In these discussions it is
awfully difficult to avoid talking about religion in general. Secularists of a certain sort denounce the impact of religion on
public policy because, in their view, all religions are basically
irrational throwbacks to a pre-Enlightenment era and are therefore fundamentally inconsistent with the personal traits that
they think desirable in citizens of a post-Enlightenment democracy. Religionists-a terrible word, but I have come up with no
other-of a certain sort approve the impact of religion on public policy because when they say religion they mean the kind of
religion of which they approve: the Catholic bishops but not
Jerry Falwell, or Jerry Falwell but not the Catholic bishops, or
Jerry Falwell and the Catholic bishops but certainly not the
Ayatollah Khomeini, and so on.8
The real problem, though, is that religion in our society is
highly diverse. This was brought home to me in reading Professor Gedicks's paper, which struck me as offkey in a couple of
ways. The first was his definition of religion as holistic and
compelling. My reaction to that was, "Well, sure it is to some
people some of the time. But, to be frank, that's not how being
Jewish feels to me even though, as I have written in a review of
Kent Greenawalt's book, so far as I can tell I am a Jew down to
the ground." 9 To the extent that his analysis is predicated on
the particular view of religion that he advances, then, I am
bound to find something odd about it.
Even more, our national politics are shot through with religion-not Bellah's civil religion, but honest-to-goodness real
religion. Yet, as we all know, the religion that pervades our
politics tends to be exceedingly watered down, not holistic and
compelling, precisely because that's the way religion is in the
United States these days. That is, the denatured version of religion that pervades our political culture is not primarily the
direct consequence of political choice. Rather, it results from
the combination of two factors. First, the lived religious experience of many people is actually denatured. Second, in a religiously pluralist society, politicians who seek to appeal to
majority views necessarily move to the center, which in this
8. An interesting discussion of this point is provided by Evans,
Contradictory Demands on the First Amendment Religion Clauses: Having It Both
Ways, 30J. CHURCH & ST. 463 (1988).

9. Tushnet, Religion in Politics (Book Review), 89 COLUM. L.
1131 (1989).
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context means that they attempt to capture that which is common to the religious views of a majority of the people. Necessarily, moving to the center strips the hard edges off religious
experience and gives religion in its public appearances a denatured cast.
The second difficulty I had was in identifying the terrible
secularism about politics that troubles Professor Gedicks. It
just does not seem to me that, as a general matter, there is a
conventional wisdom that assumes that "religious incursions
into politics [pose] great social and political dangers."" 0 From
my vantage point, our political life is shot through with overt
expressions of religious motivation: the Catholic bishops,
Archbishop Tutu and his influence on the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, Jesse Jackson, Martin Luther King,
Jr., or, as Professor Ball emphasized, George Bush's inaugural
address. There is no doubt, of course, that there are some people who see such activities as dangerous, but after all, this is a
large country, and you are likely to find some people finding
almost anything dangerous.
Two possibilities may account for Professor Gedicks's perception. First, while our politics are pervaded by religion and
by the intervention of religious figures, some important intellectuals are actively hostile to that sort of thing." Second, certain religious groups are evidently "alienated," as Professor
Gedicks puts it, from the present state of things, at least as
respects the law of church and state. Yet, from his description
and my sense of things, there is another hypothesis that, it
seems to me, better accounts for that alienation. Simply put,
that hypothesis is that people are alienated, to the extent that
they are, because they simply have not managed to get their
way. And, frankly, politics being what it is-a process in which
10. Gedicks, Some PoliticalImplications of Religious Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 419, 425 (1990).
11. Without having done a systematic survey, I would guess that, if that

is so, it results from an important religious phenomenon, the
disproportionate presence ofJews in intellectual circles in the United States.
(Another source of hostility to religious interventions in politics, at least

historically, was the position of Baptist and other evangelical churches. That
has changed somewhat recently, and in any event I doubt that there are many
serious and committed Baptists in the group of important intellectuals to
which I refer.) And it has been an important strand in Jewish thinking about
religion and politics to defend a strong strict separationist position, on the
ground, not surprisingly, that given the numerical and historical position of

Jews in Christian society, anything other than strict separation is unlikely to
be good for the Jews. For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying

note 13.
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somebody wins and somebody loses, and that's the breaks-I
doubt that there is anything normatively problematic about the
fact that some people have not been able to persuade other
people to go along with them.
The point would be different if we could identify important
areas of law in which the people had indeed been persuaded
but had not been able to get their way because the Supreme
Court blocked the implementation of their program. Of
important issues on the religious agenda, though, school
prayer is probably the only one about which that could be said,
and even there the evidence appears to be, as Professor
Gedicks notes, that in jurisdictions where people actually do
want their kids to pray in school-rather than simply mouthing
off about the Supreme Court-their children do pray in
school.' 2 The abortion issue is a more complex one from this
perspective, but I suggest that many anti-choice people are
going to be surprised and disappointed in the medium-to-long
run after the Court overrules Roe v. Wade. They have had a free
ride on the issue until now, but when they actually get down in
the trenches and have to fight out the adoption and enforcement of restrictive abortion laws, they are going to lose more
than they expect. The implication of this suggestion is that, as
a matter of fact, the present state of affairs with respect to the
availability of abortion in practice is rather close to what the
people of the country as a whole desire, although perhaps the
people would like to reach that state of affairs by a slightly different route. If I am right, even with the abortion issue we may
not have an example of a policy that the people want to adopt
but cannot because of the Supreme Court. In any event, I am
not sure that the abortion issue is one that is deeply relevant
here, because it is surely impossible to contend that the issue
has been relegated to secular and therefore dissatisfying or
alienating discussion. Again, it is not so much that the discussion is secular than it is that the anti-choice people have not
been able to get their way. No matter what one's overall political orientation, one is going to find some religious activities
sometimes having a beneficial effect on politics, and some religious activities sometimes having an adverse one.
That leads me to a point I mentioned earlier, about pluralism, and therefore to Professor Ball's paper. As Professor
Gedicks acknowledges toward the end of the paper,' 3 one difficulty in being enthusiastic about religious interventions into
12.
13.

Gedicks, supra note 10, at 437.
Id. at 435.

1990]

COMMENTARY

politics is that one's allies on one issue often turn out to be
rather unattractive when one turns to another issue, and, disturbingly, they are unattractive there in the very thing that
commends them, the depth of their commitment to their own
religion and therefore, all too often, their hostility to and intolerance of adherents of other religions. Professor Ball's discussion of the distinction between normal religion and-to
continue the Kuhnian metaphor-revolutions in religious politics suggests some of the difficulties that we would have to confront. Not only does religion serve as consolation for victims as
well as legitimation for the powers that be, it also provides the
rhetorical and spiritual resources for resistance to the existing
order. But, as Professor Ball says, when religions struggle for
space in the public sphere, they can not only disrupt the
existing order but establish their own, as against the order
sought by adherents of less successful religions.
What this suggests to me, as do Professor Gedicks's concluding comments about the risks of the infusion of real religious commitments into the public sphere, is that we may not
be as badly off as both of the papers seem to suggest. The critical tone of the papers offers us a dilemma. If we, or at least
other people, are serious about religion, we run the risk of
intolerance. Yet, if we, or at least other people, are not serious
about religion, we present a vision of the world in which religion, which for some people has been and can be an important
source of insight and inspiration, is so trivial as to be unattractive or, as Professor Ball suggests, blasphemous. Perhaps,
though, the dilemma is not as pointed as all that. As I have
said, I think that Professor Gedicks overstates the degree to
which our public life has become completely secularized. At
the same time, I agree with him, and with Professor Ball's discussion of normal religion, that the religion that does in fact
affect our public life is pretty diluted, at least when compared
with the idea of a holistic and compelling set of religious
beliefs. Yet, it may be that in a world of religious pluralism-a
world in which one ought not read "We are a religious people"
as "We are a Christian nation"-that is basically a good thing.
Justice O'Connor's slip, if it signifies more than sloppiness on
her part, symbolizes for me why I am nervous about religious
interventions into politics, even when, as with the bishops' pastoral letters on nuclear policy and on the economy, I agree with
the substance of the positions. But, and here I conclude, in this
nervousness I think I am in Professor Gedicks's company, for
his "risks" seem to me the same as my "nervousness." The
difference between us is simply that we seem to come at the
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problem from different directions, his enthusiasm about religious interventions into politics being tempered by his awareness of those risks, and my skepticism about such interventions
being offset by my appreciation of the complex role of religion
in the actual lives of the people of the religiously pluralist
United States.

